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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
After suffering through years of abuse at the hands of 
various foster parents, Tara M., a minor represented by a 
court-appointed guardian, brought an action under the 
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federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, and Pennsylvania 
law against the City of Philadelphia, several municipal and 
state agencies responsible for child welfare, and a number 
of individuals associated with those agencies for their 
allegedly negligent handling of her case. Several of the 
individuals, the City of Philadelphia, and the Philadelphia 
Department of Human Services (hereinafter "the city 
defendants") filed a third-party complaint against Tara's 
guardian ad litem, Nancy Kanter. They asserted that Kanter 
had breached various state-law duties in her negligent 
representation of Tara; therefore, if they were liable to Tara, 
the city defendants sought contribution from Kanter as a 
"joint tortfeasor" under Pennsylvania law. Kanter moved to 
dismiss the third-party complaint, asserting, inter alia, that 
she, as a court appointed guardian ad litem, was entitled to 
absolute immunity under section 1983. The district court 




Tara was born on April 10, 1987. Her 18-year-old mother 
was in the custody of the Pennsylvania child welfare system 
at the time, and Tara was consequently committed to the 
care of the child welfare system as well. During thefirst 
three years of her life, Tara and her mother were shuttled 
through six different foster homes. Authorities eventually 
discovered that Tara had been abused by her mother, and 
they determined that her mother lacked the ability properly 
to care for her. Therefore, in November 1990, Tara was 
separated from her mother and placed in another foster 
home. In January 1991, the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas appointed Nancy Kanter as guardian ad 
litem for Tara. In June 1995, Tara was placed in yet 
another foster home where she suffered sexual abuse. 
Tara's nightmare continued in her next foster home, where 
she endured a variety of physical tortures. After several 
months of recovery in various institutions, Tara returned to 
another private foster home. 
 
In February 1997, Tara, by and through her guardian ad 
litem, Kanter, filed a civil action in federal district court 
against the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia 
Department of Human Services, the Pennsylvania 
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Department of Public Welfare, several other social welfare 
organizations, and several individuals associated with all of 
these organizations. Her Complaint sought recovery under 
both federal and state law. Counts I and II of the Complaint 
assert violations of substantive due process and claim a 
remedy under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, while Counts III to VI 
contain general allegations of breach of a state imposed 
duty of care in failing to protect Tara; failure to exercise 
ordinary skill, care, knowledge, and judgment in rendering 
care, protection, and services to her; and deviation from 
standards governing professional supervision, practice, and 
behavior in caring for and servicing dependent minors like 
Tara. Count VII alleges a civil conspiracy to commit 
unlawful acts that resulted in harm to Tara. 
 
The city defendants filed a third-party complaint against 
Kanter. They claimed that if they were liable for the harm 
suffered by Tara, then the guardian ad litem, Kanter, must 
also have breached her state-law duties to protect Tara. The 
third-party plaintiffs alleged that Kanter's neglect was a 
"substantial factor" in Tara's damages, and they were 
therefore entitled to "contribution and/or indemnity" from 
Kanter as a joint tortfeasor under Pennsylvania's version of 
the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8324 (West 1982). 
 
Kanter moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. She 
argued that section 1983 does not provide for contribution, 
neither federal nor state law authorized contribution for 
liability under section 1983, and in any event she, as a 
court appointed guardian ad litem, was entitled to absolute 
immunity under section 1983. The district court denied the 
motion, observing only that the third-party plaintiffs had 
not asserted a claim for contribution under section 1983. 
Kanter now appeals. 
 
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
Normally, orders denying motions to dismiss are not 
immediately appealable. Such orders do not terminate the 
litigation and, hence, are not ordinarily final orders within 
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Nonetheless, some denials 
of motions to dismiss are final for that purpose. Cohen v. 
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Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Such 
orders are reviewable under the so-called "collateral order" 
doctrine if they 1) conclusively determine a disputed 
question; 2) resolve an important issue separate from the 
merits of the underlying action; and 3) would be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Moses 
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
11-12 (1983); Rolo v. General Dev. Corp., 949 F.2d 695, 700 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 
This appeal falls within the collateral order exception. 
First, although the district court did not expressly rule that 
Kanter was not immune from liability for contribution 
toward the third-party plaintiffs' liability under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, the order so rules by direct implication. Citing 
Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1982), Kanter 
expressly argued that, by virtue of section 1983, she was 
entitled to absolute immunity that protected her from 
having to defend against the third-party complaint. The 
effect of the district court's order was to require her to 
defend against that complaint. Thus, the court must be 
understood as having finally determined that Kanter was 
not entitled to the protection she claimed. Second, the issue 
of whether Kanter is entitled to be free of the burden of 
defending the third-party complaint is an important one 
unrelated to the merits of that complaint. Finally, the 
district court's refusal to dismiss the third party complaint 
is effectively unreviewable after entry of final judgment 
because immunity from suit is "an entitlement not to stand 
trial or face the other burdens of litigation," an entitlement 
that is "effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to 
go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
Therefore, we conclude that the district court's rejection of 
Kanter's claim of immunity falls within the collateral order 
exception to the finality rule and is subject to immediate 
review.1 Because the relevant issues in this case present 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At the conclusion of her Brief, Kanter raises two other arguments only 
tangentially related to the issue of immunity under section 1983. Even 
if we were inclined to invoke a form of "ancillary jurisdiction" over 
issues 
that are simply presented along with an immediately appealable order 
denying immunity from suit, it does not appear that Kanter raised either 
argument below, and we will not address them for the first time on 
appeal. 
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pure questions of law, we exercise plenary review. Carver v. 




Kanter argues that she is entitled to immunity from the 
third-party claim based on this court's decision in Black v. 
Bayer, 672 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1982). Black involved a 
lawsuit by a dissatisfied client asserting that his court- 
appointed attorney failed to represent him effectively, 
resulting in an allegedly improper conviction. We rejected 
this claim, holding that criminal defense counsel appointed 
by a court enjoy immunity from civil liability under section 
1983. We reasoned that potential liability would deter many 
qualified attorneys from accepting court appointments in 
criminal cases. Kanter urges us to extend the holding of 
Black to court-appointed guardians ad litem. We need not 
decide whether guardians ad litem should be cloaked with 
immunity from liability under section 1983, however, 
because any federal immunity that she may enjoy is not 
implicated here. 
 
In any situation in which contribution is being sought, it 
is helpful to recognize that three distinct liabilities are 
involved that may arise from different sources. Thefirst is 
the liability to the injured party of the party seeking 
contribution. Here, if the city defendants are liable to Tara, 
that liability may be based on federal law (S 1983), state law 
(negligence or conspiracy), or both. The second is the 
liability for contribution. Here, the city defendants assert a 
state law basis for the duty to pay contribution (the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act). Finally, 
since contribution requires a common obligation to the 
injured party, there is the liability to the injured party of 
the party from whom contribution is sought. Here, the city 
defendants allege that Kanter owed a state law duty to Tara 
("a duty to Tara M. to provide competent representation as 
is due to an adult client," App. at 59 (Third-Party Compl. 
P5)) which was breached by her. 
 
In a suit where the party seeking contribution alleges 
that a joint tortfeasor has liability to the injured party 
based on the federal Civil Rights Act, contribution may well 
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be barred if the tortfeasor would have absolute immunity in 
a Civil Rights Act suit brought by the injured party. In such 
a situation, awarding contribution would impose upon the 
tort feasor indirectly a liability against which she is 
absolutely immune under federal law. 
 
This is not, however, the situation currently before us. 
Here, the party seeking contribution has alleged that 
Kanter is liable to Tara on the basis of a state-imposed duty 
of care. A state that imposes such a duty is free to 
determine for itself who, if anyone, will be immune from 
suits to enforce that duty. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 
198 (1978). Accordingly, in these circumstances, a grant of 
contribution can impose upon Kanter no liability from 
which she is protected under federal law. It is state law that 
determines the availability and extent of contribution here 
and, even though imposition of liability upon the city 
defendants is a matter of federal concern, the duty of 
contribution involves no potential conflict with federal law 
or policy. 
 
In Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 826 F.2d 1270 (3d 
Cir. 1987), for example, an injured railroad worker had 
sued Conrail under the FELA, and Hammermill Paper 
Company, the owner of the property where the injury 
occurred, under Pennsylvania negligence law. Conrail 
cross-claimed against Hammermill for contribution, and we 
ultimately were called upon to determine whether state or 
federal law controlled the issue raised by the claim for 
contribution. We acknowledged that federal law ordinarily 
controls issues of contribution when the tort feasors are 
alleged to share a federal liability. We held, however, that 
the law of Pennsylvania governed the contribution issue 
before us because "there was no federal interest at stake" 
and the "controversy between Conrail and Hammermill [was 
one] that sound[ed] exclusively in state law." Id. at 1282. 
 
Just as in Poleto, the controversy between the city 
defendants and Kanter sounds exclusively in state law, and 
we therefore hold that Kanter is not entitled to federal 
immunity from the contribution claim of the city 
defendants. Having resolved the immunity issue that brings 
the case before us at this time, we decline to express any 
view on the unrelated issue of whether the third-party 
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complaint states a claim on which contribution can be 
granted under Pennsylvania law. The district court's order 
denying Kanter's motion to dismiss will be affirmed. 
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SHADUR, Senior District Judge, dissenting: 
 
Just this Term the Supreme Court's opinion in Steel Co. 
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012- 
16 (1998) has instructed that whenever subject matter 
jurisdiction is lacking a federal court must dismiss on that 
score, no matter how clear the path to a disposition on the 
merits may seem to be. Because my view is that we are 
indeed without jurisdiction here, I regret my inability to join 
in the majority's discussion and analysis (though I should 
add that if my view on the jurisdictional issue were 
different, I would be pleased to sign onto that persuasive 
opinion on the merits). 
 
In this instance appellate jurisdiction is sought to be 
predicated on the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), as 
it has been extended to district court decisions on 
immunity by Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) 
and its progeny such as Swint v. Chambers County 
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35 (1995). But the difficulty here is that 
the district judge never decided the question of the claimed 
immunity of third-party defendant Nancy Kanter ("Kanter") 
either way. Instead he pegged his ruling on the viability 
under Pennsylvania state law of the third-party malpractice 
claim that was advanced by the City of Philadelphia ("City") 
and its codefendants against Kanter. For us to have 
jurisdiction on appeal, then, we must hold that a ruling on 
immunity is somehow implicit in the district court's 
disposition. 
 
That is a hurdle that I do not believe has been 
surmounted here. City's third-party complaint against 
attorney Kanter seeks to hold her liable on malpractice 
grounds, which the unanimous opinion in Ferri v. 
Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 197-98, 204-05 (1979) has 
confirmed is entirely a matter of state law.1 In fact, Ferri 
itself reversed a ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania that had looked to the federal law of judicial 
immunity (more accurately, to the branch of that doctrine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Indeed, the characterization of City's claim as one sounding in state 
law has been confirmed by both attorney Kanter and the City in their 
briefs before us. 
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that applies to defense counsel such as attorney Kanter) on 
the ground that the counsel there had been appointed 
under the Criminal Justice Act in a federal criminal case. 
That approach was unanimously rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court precisely because the malpractice 
issue was entirely a matter of state law. 
 
To put the situation before us in the same terms that 
were stated in Ferri, federal law does not serve as the 
source of the City's malpractice claim against attorney 
Kanter, so as to create "a federal interest in defining the 
defenses to that claim, including the defense of immunity" 
(444 U.S. at 198 n.13). It seems to me that Ferri necessarily 
confirms that a state law claim that charges lawyer 
malpractice by a court-appointed lawyer (even one who had 
been appointed in a federal case as in Ferri, unlike the 
situation here) presents pure issues of state law that do not 
by their nature implicate the federal doctrine of absolute 
immunity. And that to me buttresses the notion that the 
district court's nondecision on the issue of immunity 
deprives his order of the type of quasi-finality that the 
Supreme Court has recognized as conferring appealability 
in the collateral-order-doctrine cases such as Mitchell and 
succeeding cases.2 As was true in Swint, 514 U.S. at 42-43, 
any issue as to Kanter's claimed immunity (if it is not 
actually mooted, as it would be if City and its codefendants 
were to prevail on the merits of plaintiff's lawsuit against 
them) "may be reviewed effectively on appeal from final 
judgment" (id. at 43). 
 
That I believe compels us under Steel Co. to halt the 
discussion at the outset by dismissing the appeal for lack 




2. It may be noted in passing that I do not view this case as posing the 
same kind of difficulty that caused dismissal of an appeal that had also 
sought to invoke the Cohen doctrine in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 
(1995). Unlike that case, this one does present a legal issue rather than 
the fact-bound questions that foreclosed interlocutory appealability 
there. 
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